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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, plaintiff/petitioner, Benchmark, Inc., ("Benchmark11) 
petitions the Court to reconsider its summary decision limiting 
Benchmark' s damages for Respondent' s breach of lease to six 
months rent and $40,000 in remodeling costs. Benchmark does not 
seek rehearing of the Court' s remand of the constructive 
eviction issue for trial. 
I. CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for Benchmark certify that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On June 28, 1991, the trial court granted 
Benchmark' s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that 
Respondents, as lessees, had breached their lease with 
Benchmark, and awarding Benchmark rents through the lease term 
as damages. The trial court dismissed Respondents' constructive 
eviction counterclaims. On August 6, 1991, judgment for 
Benchmark was entered. 
2. On August 21, 1991, Respondents appealed the 
judgment to the Utah Supreme Court. 
3. On August 30, 1991, Respondents moved for summary 
disposition. Respondents argued that genuine issues of material 
fact regarding constructive eviction precluded summary judgment. 
Alternatively, Respondents argued that if summary judgment was 
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proper, Benchmark' s damages should not exceed six months rent 
and $40,000 in remodeling costs. 
4. The Court's December 13, 1991, per curiam opinion 
granted Respondents' Motion for Summary Disposition and remanded 
the constructive-eviction for trial. The Court' s opinion went 
on to limit Benchmark' s damages to six months rent and no more 
than $40,000 of Benchmark's remodeling expenses. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether this Court misapprehended the law when it 
limited Benchmark' s damages for breach of lease to six months 
rent and $40, 000 remodeling costs. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A, TRIAL OF THE DAMAGES ISSUE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO TWO 
PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS 
In Utah, a contract is ambiguous if it can be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings. C. J. Realty, 
Inc. v. Willev. 758 P. 2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson. 751 P. 2d 
254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Here, the lease's notice of 
termination provision1 has at least two plausible meanings. 
1
 This provision provides that: 
Lessee may terminate this lease in advance of 
its expiration date by giving the Lessor six 
(6) months prior written notice of its 
intention to terminate. Lessor agrees that 
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Benchmark advanced before the trial court the first meaning, 
which is that the limited damages prescribed by the notice 
provision do not apply unless "termination by Lessee [is] made 
pursuant to [the notice provision]." August 26, 1986, Lease 
(the "Lease") H 18. The notice provision requires the lessee to 
give six-months prior written notice of its intent to terminate. 
Only when the lessee gives proper notice is the obligation to 
pay rents through the entire lease term obviated. Proper notice 
(terminating "pursuant to" the notice provision) is a condition 
precedent to the limitation of damages, as the trial court 
apparently agreed. 
pny termination fry freggee mafle PVfSWant tP 
this paragraph shall extinguish Lessee' s 
obligation to make rental payments after 
such termination date or after Lessee 
surrenders possession of the premises, 
whichever occurs later. Should Lessee elect 
to terminate this lease for any reason 
whatsoever, except for Lessor's failure or 
refusal to comply with the terms of the 
lease and/or by reason of condemnation or 
destruction of the premises, then and in 
such event, Lessee is obligated to reimburse 
Lessor one sixtieth (1/60) of the documented 
remodeling costs for each month remaining on 
the lease at the time of termination. Such 
reimbursement, in any event, shall not 
exceed the total sum of $40,000.00. 
August 26, 1986, Lease 11 18 (emphasis added), attached as 
Exhibit 5 to Respondents' Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition ("Respondents' 
Memo. •' ). 
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Respondents argued a second plausible meaning of the 
i iot i ce provi si on They asserted tha t the terminati on provision 
serves as an unrestricted 1 imitation ^n damages. Under this 
;
 interpretation, their ] iabi 1 ity wou] d be restricted 1:o the 
- s i o n d a m a g e s e \ e :i: 1 t h o i i g 1: I 11: I e}- a • ::i in. i 11 e d 1 y d i d i i o t 
g i v e s ix -months w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e i r i n t e n t t o t e r m i n a t e , 
(Respondents' Memo, pp 9 10; Lease f 18) . This Court ' s p e r 
curiam o p i i i:i oi I a d o p t s 1:1 li s ineai i i i lg 
Because both of t h e s e c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a re 
p l a u s i b l e ^ t h e Lease i s ambiguous by law and t h e meaning 
i n t e n d e d " ^b° p^r^iep nnipt- le termined at t r i a l £
 t JL_ " 
Rea l ty , Inc. / *  l <: *•*. - v ,>: c o n t r a c t i s ambiguous 
" e x t r i i i s :ii i n 1 e in t mUA 1 to *J r (" •'r *J :|' v e d 
a n d c o n s i d e r e c *- e; :-„ - --o what the p a r t i e s a c t u a l l y 
agreed to ") (emphasis added); Wilbm Y, Interstate Elec. , 748 
P 2d bH<i, 
should amend its per curiam opir ~:r . **~ - .- * - *- damages issue 
for a determination of uay part J. eg lat^ui xu drafting the 
notice provision 
B. NOTICE OF TERMINATION MUST BE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE LEASE, 
Respondents' brief to this Court implied that f hn 
paitjpi,,' i nt rndrJ' >in iimi i .( ' . u!i«", pri"\isi I'I i hf»?,iii*- the 
point because the damages for Respondents' breach are 1 imited to 
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those incurred within the notice period as a matter of law. As 
support, Respondents cite two employment (not landlord/tenant) 
cases. See Respondents' Memo. , p. 10. Although it is not clear 
from the per curiam opinion, the Court apparently relied upon 
these employment cases in limiting Respondents' liability. Such 
reliance is misplaced in a landlord/tenant case. 
The rule in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. , 776 P. 2d 
896 (Utah 1989) controls. In Reid, the landlords sued a tenant 
for breach of the lease. The tenant, like Respondents here, 
claimed that it was constructively evicted and thus relieved of 
its obligation to pay rent. The landlords prevailed at trial 
and were awarded rent through the lease term. This Court upheld 
the trial court' s findings on appeal but remanded the case for a 
determination of whether the landlords fulfilled their duty to 
mitigate through efforts to relet the premises. 776 P. 2d at 
909. The Reid Court stated that when a tenant breaches the 
lease, the landlord may recover rents through the term of the 
lease as damages, provided he/she attempts to relet the 
premises. L$l. 
Although the Reid opinion did not address the effect a 
notice-of-termination clause has on the damage calculation, 
other jurisdictions have not limited damages in landlord/tenant 
cases to those incurred during the notice period where the 
tenant, like Respondents, fail to give proper notice of 
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termination. See Deschenes v. Congel, 149 Vt. 579, 547 A. 2d 
1344 (1988)(lessee's notice of termination must be in strict 
compliance with lease to be effective); National Alfalfa 
Dehydrating & Milling Co. v. 4010 Washington, Inc. , 434 S. W. 2d 
757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)(when right to cancel lease is 
conditioned upon giving six months notice, lessee must strictly 
comply before notice is effective); A. Dubois & Son v. Goldsmith 
Bros. , 273 App. Div. 306, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 473 (1948) (right to 
terminate lease must be exercised within the time expressly 
provided). 
The lessor in Deschenes, like Benchmark, sued the 
lessee for past rents and damages. Under the lease, the lessee 
could terminate the lease by giving thirty-days prior written 
notice and payment of rent to the date of termination. The 
lessee gave written notice of his intent to terminate the lease 
without complying with the notice provision' s requirement to 
state the date of termination. The lessee then vacated the 
premises without paying rent for the thirty-day notice period. 
Analyzing the termination provision, the Deschenes Court held 
that "when a lease expresses an agreement with regard to notice 
of termination, the time, mode, and manner of such notice must 
conform to the agreement." 547 A. 2d at 1346. Because the 
lessee gave defective notice and failed to pay the required 
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rents, the court held that the lessee was liable for all rents 
and taxes due through the entire lease terms. 547 A. 2d at 1347. 
Here, Respondents do not dispute that they failed to 
give six-months prior written notice to termination. 
Respondents' Memo. p. 10. It is also uncontested that 
Respondents failed to pay rents to the date of termination and 
the remodeling costs required by the Lease. Respondents did not 
even tender such performance. Instead, they claim that no 
monies are due and no notice of termination is needed because 
they were constructively evicted. See H 8, Respondents' Answer. 
Consequently, Benchmark, like the lessor in Deschenes, was 
required to seek judicial enforcement of the lease. 
Respondents' liability is not limited either by the notice 
provision with which they failed to comply2 or by the law, as 
they incorrectly claim. 
The Respondents' employment cases do not apply. The 
contracts at issue in the employment cases were not leases for 
real property, but rather service contracts. These cases do not 
involve the interpretation of a damage clause tied to a 
termination notice provision. Instead, they address the 
sufficiency of the employer' s notice and the employee's lost 
wages resulting from termination. Shain v. Washington Nat. Ins. 
2
 £££ generally, JacKSQIl V. ELsiL 499 P. 2d 279 (Utah 
1972)(breaching party cannot claim benefits of lease). 
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Co, , 308 F. 2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962); Osborn v. Commanche Cattle 
Industries. Inc. , 545 P. 2d 827 (Okl. App. 1975). Moreover, 
there is an understandable difference between the damages rule 
applied when a lease is terminated and the employment rule the 
Respondents cite. Notice of termination of an employment 
agreement has less impact on damages because wages are paid 
contemporaneously with the performance of services. The 
employer does not usually make substantial capital expenditures 
for the employee' s benefit prior to the commencement of 
employment. Hence, for purposes of calculating damages, strict 
compliance with a notice of termination provision is less 
significant in an employment action. 
In the landlord/tenant context, however, the landlord 
may make costly improvements to the premises for the tenant' s 
benefit before the lease term commences. Here, for example, 
Benchmark undisputedly expended $126,184. 30 to improve the 
premises before Respondents took possession. Affidavit of Lynn 
Michelsen, March 15, 1991, 1 5, attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Strict compliance to lease terms 
is necessary to ensure fairness. The holdings in Reid. which 
Benchmark cited to the Court, and Deschenes (and not the 
employment cases Respondents cite) apply in this landlord/tenant 
action. 
-9-
V. CONCLUSION 
The two plausible meanings of the notice provision--
one advanced by Benchmark which the trial court adopted, and one 
advanced by Respondents and applied in this Court' s per curiam 
opinion—evidence that the notice provision is ambiguous. 
Extrinsic evidence should be presented at trial to determine the 
parties' intent. Moreover, landlord/tenant law (unlike the 
employment law rule which this Court apparently misapprehended) 
required that the Respondents' notice of termination strictly 
comply with the Lease before the damage limitation terms 
applied. The Respondents did not comply with the Lease' s notice 
provision. For these reasons, Benchmark respectfully suggests 
that the Court misapprehended the law and requests a rehearing 
on the damages issue. 
DATED this 3& day of December, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
T$*mas T. B i l l ^ W g s ^ ^ / ^ 
David L. A r r i n g t o j v - ^ 
Bryon J. Beneven£o 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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